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Abstract—Reactive synthesis is a key technique for the design
of correct-by-construction systems and has been thoroughly
investigated in the last decades. It consists in the synthesis
of a controller that reacts to environment’s inputs satisfying
a given temporal logic specification. Common approaches are
based on the explicit construction of automata and on their
determinization, which limit their scalability.
In this paper, we introduce a new fragment of Linear Tem-
poral Logic, called Extended Bounded Response LTL (LTLEBR),
that allows one to combine bounded and universal unbounded
temporal operators (thus covering a large set of practical cases),
and we show that reactive synthesis from LTLEBR specifications
can be reduced to solving a safety game over a deterministic sym-
bolic automaton built directly from the specification. We prove
the correctness of the proposed approach and we successfully
evaluate it on various benchmarks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the dawn of computer science, synthesizing correct-
by-construction systems starting from a specification is an
important and difficult task. A practical algorithm to solve
this task would be a big improvement in declarative program-
ming, since it would allow the programmer to write only
the specification of the program, freeing her from possible
design or implementation errors, that, in many cases, are
due to an imperative style of programming. In the context of
formal verification and model-based design, the possibility of
synthesizing a controller able to comply with the specification
for all possible behaviors of the environment would be of great
importance as well: all the effort would be directed to improve
the quality of the specification for the controller.
Reactive synthesis was first proposed by Church [7] and
solved by Bu¨chi and Landweber [5] for S1S specifications
with an algorithm of nonelementary complexity. For Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) specifications, the problem has been
shown to be 2EXPTIME-complete [20], [21]. In the attempt
of making reactive synthesis a practical task, in spite of its
very high complexity, research mainly focused on two lines:
(i) finding good algorithms for the average case; (ii) restricting
the expressiveness of the specification language. Important
examples of the first line of research are the contribution
by Kupferman and Vardi [14], where the authors devise a
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procedure to avoid Safra’s determinization of Bu¨chi automata
(a known bottleneck in all the problems requiring a determiniz-
ation of a Bu¨chi automaton), and the work by Finkbeiner and
Schewe [10], where the problem is reduced to a sequence of
smaller problems on safety automata, obtained by bounding the
number of visits to a rejecting state of a co-Bu¨chi automaton. A
meaningful example of restrictions to the specification language
is the definition of the Generalized Reactivity(1) logic [19],
whose synthesis problem can be solved in O(N3) symbolic
steps, where N is the size of the arena. Finally, in [24] Zhu et
al. consider reactive synthesis from Safety LTL specifications.
Although the complexity remains doubly exponential, the
proposed restriction allows one to reason on finite words and
thus to exploit efficient tools for finite-state automata, like, for
instance, MONA [11].
In this paper, we propose a new fragment of LTL, called
Extended Bounded Response LTL (LTLEBR for short), which
supports bounded operators [17], such as G[a,b] and F[a,b], along
with universal unbounded temporal operators like G and R. We
show that formulas of LTLEBR can be turned into deterministic
symbolic automata over infinite words, with a translation carried
out in a completely symbolic way. Such a result is achieved
in two steps: (i) a pastification of the subformulas containing
only bounded operators by making use of techniques similar to
those exploited for MTL [16], [17], and (ii) the construction of
deterministic monitors for the unbounded temporal operators.
These two steps allow the entire procedure to be carried out
without ever producing any explicit automaton. Then, we use
existing algorithms for safety synthesis to solve the game on
the deterministic symbolic automaton. We implemented the
proposed solution in a tool, called ebr-ltl-synth, and compared
its performance against state-of-the-art synthesizers for full
LTL over a set of LTLEBR formulas. The outcomes of the
experimental evaluation are encouraging. For lack of space,
some of the proofs are reported in the appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Linear Temporal Logic with Past (LTL+P) is a modal logic
interpreted over infinite state sequences. Let Σ be a set of pro-
positions. LTL+P formulas are inductively defined as follows:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | Xφ | φ1 U φ2 | Yφ | φ1 S φ2
where p ∈ Σ. Temporal operators can be subdivided into the
future operators, next (X) and until (U), and past operators,
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2yesterday (Y) and since (S). We define the following common
abbreviations (where > stands for true): (i) Xiφ is X(Xi−1φ)
if i > 0 and X0φ is φ; (ii) release: φ1R φ2 ≡ ¬(¬φ1 U ¬φ2);
(iii) eventually: Fφ1 ≡ > U φ1; (iv) globally: Gφ1 ≡ ¬F¬φ1;
(v) trigger: φ1T φ2 ≡ ¬(¬φ1S¬φ2); (vi) once: Oφ1 ≡ >Sφ1;
(vii) historically: Hφ1 ≡ ¬O¬φ1.
LTL is obtained from LTL+P by allowing only the next and
the until operators. Conversely, Full Past LTL (LTLFP) is the
fragment of LTL+P that only admits past operators.
LTL can also be enriched with bounded temporal operators,
such as the bounded until (φ1U [a,b]φ2) and bounded eventually
(F[a,b]φ1 ≡ > U [a,b] φ1). Full Bounded LTL (LTLFB) is the
fragment of LTL that includes only the next, bounded until,
and bounded eventually operators.
Let us now give the semantics of the above logics. A state
sequence is an infinite sequence σ = 〈σ0, σ1, . . .〉 ∈ (2Σ)ω of
sets of propositions σi ∈ 2Σ, called states. Given a sequence
σ, a position i ≥ 0, and a formula φ, the satisfaction of φ by
σ at i, written σ, i |= φ, is inductively defined as follows:
σ, i |= p iff p ∈ σi
σ, i |= ¬φ iff σ, i 6|= φ
σ, i |= φ1 ∨ φ2 iff either σ, i |= φ1 or σ, i |= φ2
σ, i |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff σ, i |= φ1 and σ, i |= φ2
σ, i |= Xφ iff σ, i+ 1 |= φ
σ, i |= Yφ iff i > 0 and σ, i− 1 |= φ
σ, i |= φ1 U φ2 iff there exists j ≥ i such that
σ, j |= φ2 and σ, k |= φ1 for all
i ≤ k < j
σ, i |= φ1 S φ2 iff there exists j ≤ i such that
σ, j |= φ2 and σ, k |= φ1 for all
j < k ≤ i
σ, i |= φ1 U [a,b] φ2 iff there exists j ∈ [i+ a, i+ b]
such that σ, j |= φ2 and
σ, k |= φ1 for all i ≤ k < j
We say that σ satisfies φ, written σ |= φ, if and only if
σ, 0 |= φ. We define the language L(φ) of a temporal formula
φ as L(φ) = {σ ∈ (2Σ)ω | σ |= φ}.
Symbolic safety automata and safety games
To begin with, we formally define the problems of realizab-
ility and reactive synthesis for temporal formulas.
As for realizability, it is convenient to view it as a two-
player game between Controller, whose aim is to satisfy the
specification, and Environment, who tries to violate it.
Definition 1 (Strategy): Let Σ = C ∪ U be an alphabet
partitioned into the set of controllable variables C and the set
of uncontrollable ones U , such that C ∩ U = ∅. A strategy
for Controller is a function g : (2U )+ → 2C that, given the
sequence U = 〈U0, . . . ,Un〉 of choices made by Environment
so far, determines the current choices Cn = g(U) of Controller.
Given a strategy g : (2U )+ → 2C and an infinite sequence of
uncontrollable choices U = 〈U0,U1, . . .〉 ∈ (2U )ω , let g(U) =
〈U0 ∪ g(〈U0〉),U1 ∪ g(〈U0,U1〉), . . .〉 be the state sequence
resulting from reacting to U according to g.
Definition 2 (Realizability and Synthesis): Let φ be a
temporal formula over the alphabet Σ = C∪U . We say that φ is
realizable if and only if there exists a strategy g : (2U )+ → 2C
such that, for any infinite sequence U = 〈U0,U1, . . .〉 ∈ (2U )ω ,
it holds that g(U) |= φ. If φ is realizable, the synthesis problem
is the problem of computing such a strategy g.
Temporal logic has an intimate relationship with automata
on infinite words [23], where different acceptance conditions
give rise to different classes of automata. For instance, the
acceptance condition of (non-deterministic) Bu¨chi automata
allows them to recognize the class of ω-regular languages [4],
including all languages definable by LTL+P formulas.
Here, we focus on a restricted type of acceptance condition,
called safety condition, and we represent automata in a symbolic
way, as opposed to their common explicit representation.
Definition 3 (Symbolic Safety Automata): A symbolic
safety automaton (SSA) is a tuple A = (V, I, T, S), where
(i) V = X ∪Σ, where X is a set of state variables and Σ is a
set of input variables, and (ii) I(X), T (X,Σ, X ′), and S(X),
with X ′ = {x′ | x ∈ X}, are Boolean formulae which define
the set of initial states, the transition relation, and the set of
safe states, respectively.
In symbolic automata, states are identified by the values of
state variables, and both initial/final states and the transition
relation are represented as Boolean formulas. This allows
them to be, in many cases, exponentially more succinct than
equivalent explicitly represented automata. In particular, the
transition relation T (X,Σ, X ′) is built over state variables,
input variables, and a primed version of state variables that
represent the values of state variables at the next state. As
an example, if a variable x has to flip at every transition, the
transition relation would contain a clause of the form x⇔ ¬x′.
Definition 4 (Acceptance of SSA): Let A be an SSA. A
trace is a sequence τ = 〈τ0, τ1, . . .〉 ∈ (2V )ω of subsets τi
of V that satisfies the transition relation of A, that is, such
that for all i ≥ 0, T (X,Σ, X ′) is satisfied when τi is used to
interpret variables from X and Σ, and τi+1 is used to interpret
variables from X ′. We say that a trace τ is induced by a word
σ = 〈σ0, σ1, . . .〉 ∈ (2Σ)ω iff σi = τi∩Σ for all i ≥ 0. A trace
τ is accepting (or safe) iff τi satisfies S(X) for all i ≥ 0. The
language of A, denoted as L(A), is the set of all σ ∈ (2Σ)ω
such that there exists an accepting trace induced by σ in A.
For reactive synthesis, a crucial property of an automaton A
is determinism, since in order to check if σ ∈ L(A) it suffices
to check if the trace induced by σ in A is accepting.
Definition 5 (Deterministic SSA): An SSA A = (V, I, T, S)
is deterministic if:
1) the formula I has exactly one satisfying assignment;
2) the transition relation is of the form:
T (X,Σ, X ′) :=
∧
x∈X
(x′ ⇔ βx(X ∪ Σ))
where each βx(X ∪ Σ) is a Boolean formula over X and Σ.
Note that Def. 5 implies that for each σ ∈ (2Σ)ω , there exists
exactly one trace induced by σ for any given deterministic SSA.
The realizability and the synthesis problems can be defined
over a deterministic automaton as well; this gives rise to a
safety game, which is defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Safety Game): Let A be a deterministic SSA
over the alphabet Σ = C ∪ U . A safety game is a tuple G =
〈A, C,U〉, where C and U are the sets of controllable and
3uncontrollable variables, respectively. We say that Controller
wins the game if and only if there is a strategy g : (2U )+ → 2C
such that for all sequences U = 〈U0,U1, . . .〉 ∈ (2U)ω , the trace
τ induced by g(U) in A is accepting.
III. EXTENDED BOUNDED RESPONSE LTL
In this section, we define Extended Bounded Response
LTL, abbreviated LTLEBR. LTLEBR extends LTLFB (which only
features bounded operators) by admitting Boolean combinations
of the universal unbounded temporal operators release (R) and
globally (G).
Definition 7 (The logic LTLEBR): Let a, b ∈ N. An LTLEBR
formula χ is inductively defined as follows:
ψ := p | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∨ ψ2 | Xψ | ψ1 U [a,b] ψ2 Full Bounded Layer
φ := ψ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | Xφ | Gφ | ψR φ Future Layer
χ := φ | χ1 ∨ χ2 | χ1 ∧ χ2 Boolean Layer
We refer to Sec. II for the semantics of LTLEBR operators. In
the next sections, we will show how to build, given an LTLEBR
formula φ, a deterministic symbolic safety automaton A(φ)
such that L(A(φ)) = L(φ).
A. Examples
We now give some simple examples of requirements that
can be expressed in the LTLEBR logic.
The first one is a typical bounded response requirement:
Controller has to answer a grant g at most k time units after
the request r of Environment is issued. It can be expressed by
the following LTLEBR formula:
G(r → F[0,k]g)
Another quite common requirement is mutual exclusion. As
an example, the case of an arbiter that has to grant a resource
to at most one client at once can be captured as follows (for
each i, gi means that the resource has been granted to client i):
G(
∧
1≤i<j≤n
¬(gi ∧ gj))
When a set of clients with different priorities has to be
managed, it is possible to introduce a requirement stating that,
whenever two or more clients simultaneously send a request,
clients with a higher priority must be granted before those with
a lower one (i < j means that the priority of client i is higher
than that of client j):∧
1≤i<j≤n
G((ri ∧ rj)→ (¬gj) U [0,k] gi)
Finally, in many situations it is important to include require-
ments about the configuration of a system model. Consider the
case of a thermostat. One may ask that if the prog modality
is off, then the controller has to communicate the signal on
to the boiler for an indefinitely long amount of time, while,
in case the prog modality is on, it has to do that only for
a specific interval of time, say [h1, h2], after which it has to
stop the communication with the boiler. This can be expressed
in LTLEBR by the following formula:
(¬prog ∧ G(on)) ∨ (prog ∧ G[h1,h2](on) ∧ Xh2G(off))
B. Comparison with other temporal logics
Zhu et al. [24] studied the synthesis problem for Safety
LTL, which can be viewed as the until-free fragment of LTL
in negated normal form (NNF). Every formula φ of LTLEBR
can be turned into a Safety LTL one by (i) transforming φ
in NNF and (ii) expanding each bounded operator in terms
of conjunctions or disjunctions. As an example, the LTLEBR
formula φ := G(p→ F[0,5]q) is equivalent to the Safety LTL
formula φ′ := G(p → ∨5i=0 Xiq). However, since constants
in LTLEBR are represented by using a logarithmic encoding,
LTLEBR formulas can be exponentially more succinct than
Safety LTL ones. Whether the converse holds as well, i.e.,
whether any formula of Safety LTL can be translated into
an equivalent LTLEBR one, is still an open question. As an
example, G(p∨Gq) is a Safety LTL formula but, syntactically,
is not an LTLEBR one.
Maler et al. [17] introduced Metric Temporal Logic with a
Bounded-Horizon (MTL−B for short) as the metric temporal
logic with only bounded operators interpreted over dense time.
They addressed the problem of reactive synthesis from MTL−B
specifications by showing that each MTL−B formula can be
transformed into a deterministic timed automaton. With respect
to this fragment, and ignoring the differences in the underlying
temporal structures (in our setting, time is discrete), LTLEBR
extends MTL−B with Boolean combinations of unbounded
universal temporal operators.
IV. FROM LTLEBR TO
DETERMINISTIC SYMBOLIC SAFETY AUTOMATA
This section focuses on the procedure to turn every LTLEBR
formula into a deterministic symbolic safety automaton on
infinite words (see Def. 5) that recognizes the same language.
In doing that, we apply a few transformation steps on the
formula, summarized in Fig. 1, to simplify its syntactic structure
and turn it into a form amenable to direct transformation into
a deterministic SSA. We define two syntactic restrictions of
LTLEBR that are the targets of the transformation steps.
Definition 8 (PastLTLEBR): An PastLTLEBR formula χ is
inductively defined as follows:
ψ := p | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∨ ψ2 | Yψ | ψ1 S ψ2
φ := ψ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | Xφ | Gφ | (Xiψ)R φ
χ := φ | χ1 ∨ χ2 | χ1 ∧ χ2
Definition 9 (Canonical PastLTLEBR): The canonical form
of PastLTLEBR formulas is inductively defined as follows:
ψ := p | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∨ ψ2 | Yψ | ψ1 S ψ2
φ := ψ | Gψ | ψ1 R ψ2
λ := φ | Xλ
χ := λ | χ1 ∨ χ2 | χ1 ∧ χ2
Canonical PastLTLEBR formulas do not contain nested
occurrences of unbounded temporal operators, whose operands
can be only full-past formulas, and each of these is prefixed
by an arbitrary number of next operators.
The transformation of LTLEBR formulas into deterministic
SSAs consists of three steps: (i) a translation from LTLEBR
4LTLEBR φ
PastLTLEBR φ
· toPastLtlEbr
Canonical PastLTLEBR φ
· canonize
DFA A(φ)
· ltl2smv
AIGER
· fsmv2aig
result (real./unreal.)
· call to a safety synthesizer
Figure 1. The overall procedure.
to PastLTLEBR; (ii) a translation from PastLTLEBR to its
canonical form; (iii) a transformation of canonical PastLTLEBR
formulas into deterministic SSAs. Once a deterministic SSA
A(φ) for the original LTLEBR formula φ over C ∪ U has been
obtained, to solve the safety game 〈A(φ), C,U〉, i.e., to decide
the existence of a strategy for Controller in the automaton, we
apply an existing safety synthesis algorithm (see Def. 6).
A. From LTLEBR to PastLTLEBR
Let φ be an LTLEBR formula. The first step consists in
translating each LTLFB subformula of φ into an equivalent one,
which is of the form Xdψ, with ψ ∈ LTLFP and d ∈ N. We
refer to this process as pastification [16], [17]. As we will see,
since “the past has already happened”, full-past formulas can
be represented by deterministic monitors.
In order to pastify each LTLFB subformula of φ, we adapt to
LTLEBR a technique developed by Maler et al. for MTL−B [16],
[17]. Intuitively, for each model of a full-bounded formula φ,
there exists a furthermost time point d (the temporal depth of
φ) such that the subsequent states cannot be constrained by φ
in any way. The pastification of φ is a formula that uses only
past operators and that is equivalent to φ when interpreted at
time point d instead of at the origin.
Definition 10 (Temporal Depth [17]): Let φ be an LTLFB
formula. The temporal depth of φ, denoted as D(φ), is
inductively defined as follows:
• D(p) = 0, for all p ∈ Σ
• D(¬φ1) = D(φ1)
• D(φ1 ∧ φ2) = max{D(φ1), D(φ2)}
• D(Xφ1) = 1 +D(φ1)
• D(φ1 U [a,b] φ2) = b+ max{D(φ1), D(φ2)}
Let Mφ (only M if unambiguous) be the greatest constant in
φ, with Mφ = 0 if φ has no constants. It can be observed that
D(φ) ≤M · n, where n = |φ|.
Definition 11 (Pastification [17]): Let φ be an LTLFB
formula and d ≥ D(φ). The pastification of φ is the formula
Π(φ, d) inductively defined as follows:
• Π(p, d) = Ydp
• Π(¬φ, d) = ¬Π(φ, d)
• Π(φ1 ∧ φ2, d) = Π(φ1, d) ∧Π(φ2, d)
• Π(Xφ, d) = Π(φ, d− 1)
• Π(φ1 U [a,b] φ2, d) =∨b−a
t=0 (Y
t(Π(φ2, d− b) ∧ Hb−t−1YΠ(φ1, d− b)))
Note that from Def. 11 we can derive that Π(F[a,b]φ, d) ≡
Π(> U [a,b] φ, d) ≡ ∨b−at=0 YtΠ(φ, d − b), which can be suc-
cinctly written using the once operator, hence we can define
Π(F[a,b]φ, d) = O[0,b−a]Π(φ, d− b).
Proposition 1 (Soundness of pastification): Let ϕ be a
LTLFB formula. For all state sequences σ ∈ (2Σ)ω, all i ∈ N,
and all d ≥ D(φ), it holds that:
σ, i |= ϕ ⇔ σ, i |= XdΠ(ϕ, d)
From now on, let pastify(φ) be the formula
XD(φ)Π(φ,D(φ)). As an example, if φ := F[0,k1](q∧F[0,k2]p),
then pastify(φ) := Xk1+k2O[0,k1](Yk2q ∧ O[0,k2]p). We state
the following complexity result about pastification.
Proposition 2: Let φ be a LTLFB formula. Then, pastify(φ)
is a formula of size O(n2 ·M log2 n+1), where n = |φ| and M
is the greatest constant in φ.
Proof: See the appendix.
Note that if φ has no constants, that is, M = 1, the size of
pastify(φ) is O(n2) . Given an LTLEBR formula φ, we pastify
each of its LTLFB subformulas with the pastify operator: we
call this step toPastLtlEbr. Once it has been completed, the
resulting formula belongs to PastLTLEBR.
The toPastLtlEbr algorithm can be improved by observing that
there are LTLFB formulas that already belong to PastLTLEBR.
One example is the formula p∧XXXq. Obviously, for this kind
of formulas there is no need for the algorithm to pastify them.
Consider the previous example. Without the proposed trick, the
algorithm would have produced the formula XXX(YYYp ∧ q),
while, by simply noticing that the formula already belongs to
PastLTLEBR, it does not need to pastify anything, returning
p ∧ XXXq.
Proposition 3: For each LTLEBR formula φ, there is an
equivalent PastLTLEBR formula φ′ of size O(n3 ·M log2 n+1),
where n = |φ| and M is the greatest constant in φ.
Proof: Let φ be an LTLEBR formula and let φ′ :=
toPastLtlEbr(φ). By Prop. 1, the toPastLtlEbr algorithm replaces
the LTLFB subformulas of φ with an equivalent formula, hence
φ ≡ φ′. Since in φ there are at most n = |φ| subformulas,
then, by Prop. 2, |φ′| = n · O(n2 · M log2 n+1), that is,
|φ′| = O(n3 ·M log2 n).
Note that if there are no constants in φ, that is, M = 1, then,
by Prop. 2, |toPastLtlEbr(φ)| = O(n3).
B. From PastLTLEBR to Canonical PastLTLEBR
The second step is the canonization of the PastLTLEBR
formula obtained from the previous step, in order to obtain
an equivalent formula in canonical form (Def. 9). Canonical
PastLTLEBR formulas are Boolean combinations of formulas
of the form Xiψ1, XiGψ1, and Xi(ψ1 R ψ2), where ψ1 and
ψ2 are full past formulas. Compared to general PastLTLEBR
formulas, formulas in canonical form do not admit neither
nested unbounded operators nor next operators in front of
5the left-hand argument of a release. The canonization of a
PastLTLEBR formula is obtained by applying a set of rewriting
rules.
Definition 12 (Canonization): Given a PastLTLEBR formula
φ, canonize(φ) is the formula obtained by recursively applying
the R1-R7 rules to the subformulas of φ in a bottom-up fashion
followed by the application of the Rflat rule:
R1 : X(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) Xψ1 ∧ Xψ2
R2 : ψR (ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ψR ψ1 ∧ ψR ψ2
R3 : (X
iψ1)R (Xjψ2) {
Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−jψ2)) if i > j
Xj((Yj−iψ1)R ψ2) otherwise
R4 : (X
iψ1)R (Xj(ψ2 R ψ3)) {
Xi(ψ1 R ((Yi−jψ2)R (Yi−jψ3))) if i > j
Xj((Yj−iψ1)R (ψ2 R ψ3)) otherwise
R5 : GX
iGψ  XiGψ
R6 : GX
i(ψ1 R ψ2) XiGψ2
R7 : (X
iψ1)R (XjGψ2) {
XiGYi−jψ2 if i > j
XjGψ2 otherwise
Rflat : X
i(ψ1 R (ψ2 R (. . . (ψn−1 R ψn) . . . ))) 
Xi((ψn−1 ∧ O(ψn−2 ∧ . . .O(ψ1 ∧ Yi>) . . . ))R ψn)
for any n ≥ 3
where ψ, ψ1, ψ2, and ψ3 are full-past formulae.
It is worth noticing that, as far as for now, we do not have
rules (preserving the equivalence) to deal with the following
cases: (i) (φ1∧φ2)R(φ), (ii) (Gφ1)R(φ) or (iii) (φ1Rφ2)R(φ).
This is why in Def. 7 we restricted the left-hand argument of
each release operator to be a full-bounded formula.
Lemma 1 (Soundness of canonize(·)): For any PastLTLEBR
formula φ, it holds that φ and canonize(φ) are equivalent and
canonize(φ) is a Canonical PastLTLEBR formula.
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 4 (Complexity of canonize(·)): For any
PastLTLEBR formula φ, canonize(φ) can be built in O(n) time,
and the size of canonize(φ) is O(n), where n = |φ|.
Proof: See the appendix.
C. From Canonical PastLTLEBR to deterministic SSA
The particular shape of canonical PastLTLEBR formulas
makes it possible to encode the specification into deterministic
SSAs. The key observation is that LTLFP formulas can be
encoded into deterministic automata: since these formulas talk
exclusively about the past, their truth can be evaluated at any
single step depending only on previous steps, without making
any guess about the future (“the past already happened”).
But LTLFP formulae are not the only ones that can be
encoded deterministically. Consider, for instance, the formula
φ ≡ Xp ∨ Xq. At a first glance, it may seem that φ needs a
non-deterministic automaton to be encoded, which at the first
state makes a choice about whether p or q will hold in the
next state. Nevertheless, this formula is equivalent to X(p∨ q)
and it corresponds to the deterministic automaton that, once
arrived in its second state by reading any proposition symbol,
proceeds to an accepting state by reading either p or q, or goes
to a sink (error) state otherwise.
PastLTLEBR in its canonical form combines full past formu-
las into a broader language that can still be turned into symbolic
deterministic automata, extending the above intuition and
exploiting the monitorability of universal temporal operators.
Monitoring is a technique coming from runtime verifica-
tion [15]. Consider the formula Gα. By observing a state
sequence, at each step we can decide if a violation has occurred;
indeed, if α is false at the current step, then the value of Gα is
certainly false for each of the previous steps. More generally,
universal temporal formulas, such as Gφ and φ1 R φ2, are
monitorable, meaning that a violation of them can be decided
on the basis of the observation of a finite number of steps.
In particular, reporting an error in the next state can be done
by considering only the current values. This means that any
universal temporal operator can be monitored by adding a
Boolean error variable with a deterministic transition relation.
Therefore, despite not being able to evaluate the truth of
a formula such as Gα, as it can be done in the case of past
operators, we can nevertheless state in the accepting condition
that an error state can never be reached. In this way, if the
trace is accepting, that is, an error state can never be reached,
then we know that there are no violations, e.g., for Gα, we
have forced α to be true in every state. Otherwise, if the trace
is not accepting, that is, an error state is reachable, we know
that there is a (finite) violation and that the temporal formula
was falsified at some step. We therefore introduce an error
bit for each Xiψ1, XiGψ1, and Xi(ψ1 R ψ2) of a canonical
PastLTLEBR formula.
Let φ be a canonical PastLTLEBR formula over the alphabet
Σ = C ∪ U . We define the deterministic SSA A(φ) =
(V, I, T, S) as follows:
• Variables. The set of state variables of the automaton is
defined as X = XP ∪XF ∪XC , where:
XP = {vα | α is an LTLFP subformula of φ}
XF =
{
errorϕ
∣∣∣∣∣ ϕ is subformula of φ of the formXiψ, XiGψ, or Xi(ψ1 R ψ2)
}
XC =
{
counteri
∣∣∣∣∣ i ∈ {0, . . . , log2 d}d max. among all Xdψ in φ.
}
Intuitively, variables in XP track the truth value of all
the full-past subformulas, variables in XF implement the
above-described monitoring mechanism, and variables in
XC are used to encode a binary counter used to monitor
nested tomorrow operators. In particular, for n nested
tomorrow operators, a counter with log2(n) bits is needed.
• Initial state. All the state variables, including the counter
bits, are initially false, that is, I(X) =
∧
x∈X ¬x.
• Transition relation. T (X,Σ, X ′) is the conjunction of the
transition functions of the binary counter and the monitors
of each subformula of φ, as will be defined later. Notice
6that each conjunct is of the form x′ ⇔ β(X ∪ Σ), and
thus it is a deterministic transition relation.
• Safety condition. S(X) is a Boolean formula obtained
from φ by replacing each formula ϕ ∈ XF by ¬errorϕ,
i.e., S(X) = φ[ϕ/¬errorϕ].
We now define the monitors for the binary counter, used to
handle nested tomorrow operators, any formula ψ ∈ LTLFP, and
any canonical PastLTLEBR formula of one of the forms Xiψ1,
XiGψ1, and Xi(ψ1Rψ2). We give the definition of the monitors
using the SMV language [6], as it provides useful shorthands
(like the switch-case primitive). Each of the following SMV
statement corresponds to the Boolean formula that defines
transition functions of our monitors.
The monitor for the counter is defined as follows:
n e x t ( c o u n t e r 0 ) := ¬ c o u n t e r 0
n e x t ( c o u n t e r i ) := ( c o u n t e r i−1 ∨ c o u n t e r i ) ∧ ¬ c o u n t e r i
If ψ := α S β or Yα, its monitor is defined as follows:
n e x t (vYα ) := vα ∧ c o u n t e r> 0
DEFINE
vαSβ := vβ ∨ (vα ∧ vY(α))
If ψ is a propositional atom, a negation, or a disjunction of
full-past formulas, we define its monitor as follows:
DEFINE
vp := p
v¬α := ¬vα
vα∨β := vα ∨ vβ
For each formula φ of type Xiψ, where ψ is a full-past
formula, we introduce a new error bit errorφ. Its monitor is
defined as follows:
n e x t (errorXiψ ) := c a s e
errorXiψ : TRUE;
counter = i ∧ ¬vψ : TRUE;
TRUE : FALSE ;
e s a c
If φ := XiGψ, where ψ is a full-past formula, we introduce
a new error bit errorφ, and we define its monitor as follows:
n e x t (errorXiGψ ) := c a s e
counter < i : FALSE ;
¬errorXiGψ ∧ vψ : FALSE ;
TRUE : TRUE;
e s a c
The same for φ := Xi(ψ1 R ψ2):
n e x t (errorXi(ψ1Rψ2) ) := c a s e
counter < i : FALSE ;
¬errorXi(ψ1Rψ2) ∧ v
i
ψ
p
1
: FALSE ;
¬errorXi(ψ1Rψ2) ∧ vψ1 ∧ vψ2 : FALSE ;¬errorXi(ψ1Rψ2) ∧ vψ2 : FALSE ;
TRUE : TRUE;
e s a c
n e x t (vi
ψ
p
1
) := c a s e
counter < i : FALSE ;
vψp1
: TRUE;
vi
ψ
p
1
: TRUE;
TRUE : FALSE ;
e s a c
In Fig. 2, we describe the execution of all the steps described
so far on a simple formula.
G(u1 → XXc1) ∧ G(u2 → Xc2)
GXX(YYu1 → c1) ∧ GX(Yu2 → c2)
XXG(YYu1 → c1) ∧ XG(Yu2 → c2)
ASSIGN
init(error1) := ⊥
next(error1) := . . .
ASSIGN
init(error2) := ⊥
next(error2) := . . .
INVARSPEC
¬error1 ∧ ¬error2
pastify
canonize
to SSA
Figure 2. The execution of the sequence of steps: a simple example.
Proposition 5: Let φ be a canonical PastLTLEBR formula,
with |φ| = n. Then, there exists a deterministic SSA of size
O(n) that accepts the same language.
Theorem 1: Let φ be an LTLEBR formula, with |φ| = n,
and let M be the greatest constant in φ. Then, there exists a
deterministic SSA of size O(n3 ·M log2 n+1) that accepts the
same language.
Corollary 1: Let φ be an LTLEBR formula with no constants,
with |φ| = n. Then, there exists a deterministic SSA of size
O(n3) that accepts the same language.
Proofs of the above statements can be found in the appendix.
V. SOLVING THE GAME ON THE
SYMBOLIC DETERMINISTIC AUTOMATON
Once we have obtained the deterministic SSA A(φ) for an
LTLEBR formula φ with the steps described in the previous
sections, we can use A(φ) as the arena of a two-player game
between Controller and Environment in order to solve the
realizability (and synthesis) problem for φ.
Let us focus on the safety game G = 〈A(φ), C,U〉 (recall
Def. 6). Safety games have been extensively studied, as
their reachability objective makes the problem simpler than
considering ω-regular objectives, such as, for instance, Bu¨chi
and Rabin conditions.
The aim of Controller is to choose an infinite sequence of
controllable variables in such a way that, no matter what values
for the uncontrollable variables are chosen by Environment, the
trace induced by the play in A(φ) is safe, that is, it visits only
states s such that s |= S(X) (see Def. 6). Since in our case
A(φ) recognizes exactly the language of φ, the play satisfies
φ, and thus Controller has a winning strategy for φ.
Since the organization of the SYNTCOMP [13], many
optimized tools have been proposed in the literature to solve
safety games. For this reason, we chose to use a safety
synthesizer as a black box. The majority of these tools accept
as input a symbolic arena described in terms of and-inverter
graphs (or AIGER format [1]), so we provide a simple utility to
obtain the AIGER representation of functional SMV modules,
that is, SMV modules with the transition relation expressed
only in terms of ASSIGN statements, such as the ones resulting
7from our encoding. The AIGER model is then given as input to
the chosen safety synthesizer, completing the process outlined
in Fig. 1.
The next theorem states the complexity of the procedure.
Theorem 2: The realizability problem for LTLEBR belongs
to 2EXPTIME. If no constant is admitted, it belongs to
EXPTIME.
Proof: We first show that the proposed algorithm, as
described in Fig. 1, belongs to 2EXPTIME for generic LTLEBR
formulas. It is easy to see that the time complexity of all the
steps matches their space complexity. Therefore, we have an
algorithm to turn an LTLEBR formula φ into an equivalent
deterministic SSA A(φ) whose time complexity is O(n3 ·
M log2 n+1), where n = |φ| and M is the greatest constant in
φ. Since A(φ) is symbolically represented, it can be turned
into an explicit automaton A′(φ) of size at most exponential in
the size of A(φ), that is, | A′(φ)| ∈ O(2n3·M log2 n+1). Finally,
the time complexity of reachability games is linear in the size
of the arena [8], and thus the overall time complexity of the
realizability problem for LTLEBR is 2EXPTIME. If no constant
is admitted, then, by Corollary 2, | A′(φ)| ∈ O(2n3), and the
complexity becomes EXPTIME.
Comparison with Safety LTL
It is interesting to briefly compare the proposed procedure
for realizability to the one used by the Ssyft tool for Safety
LTL specifications [24]. In that tool, the negation of the initial
formula is first translated into first-order logic over finite words
and then transformed into deterministic automata using the
tool MONA [11], which uses the classical subset construction
to determinize automata over finite words. Finally, Ssyft uses
the classical backward fixpoint iteration to compute the set
of winning states over the DFA. It is worth to notice that
the way MONA represents automata is not fully symbolic: the
set of states is explicitly represented, while it uses a BDD
for each pair of states in order to represent symbolically the
transitions between the two corresponding states. In contrast of
subset construction, our solution performs the pastification of
full-bounded formulas. Most importantly, our construction of
deterministic monitors is carried out in a fully symbolic way.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We implemented the proposed procedure (see Fig. 1) in a
tool called ebr-ltl-synth.1 The transformation from LTLEBR to
deterministic SSA together with the translation to AIGER has
been implemented inside the nuXmv model checker [6]. As
the backend for solving the safety game, we have chosen the
SAT-based tool demiurge [2].
We tested our tool on a set of scalable benchmarks divided
in four categories (the propositional atoms starting with the
letter c are controllable, while those starting with the letter u
are uncontrollable):
1) the first category is generated by the realizable formula:
G(c0 ∧ XG(c1 ∧ · · · ∧ XnG(cn ∧ u) . . . ))
1http://users.dimi.uniud.it/∼luca.geatti/tools/ebrltlsynth.html
2) the second category is generated by the realizable formula:
G((c0 ∨ u0) ∧ XG((c1 ∨ u1) ∧ · · · ∧ XnG((cn ∨ un)) . . . ))
3) the third category is generated by the unrealizable formula:
G(c) ∧
n∨
i=1
G(
i∧
j=0
ui)
4) the fourth category is generated by the unrealizable
formula:
c ∧
n∧
i=1
Xi(ui ∨ ui+1)
Each category contains the respective scalable formula for
n ∈ [1, 200], for a total of 800 benchmarks, half of which is
realizable and the other half is unrealizable. We set a timeout
of 180 seconds for each benchmark. We compared ebr-ltl-synth
with ltlsynt [12], Strix [18] and Ssyft [24]. The first two tools
solve the realizability and synthesis problems for full LTL and
are based on a translation to parity games. ltlsynt uses SPOT
[9] for efficient translation and manipulation of automata. Strix
implements several optimizations like specification splitting,
that enables to split the initial formula in safety, co-safety,
Bu¨chi, and co-Bu¨chi subformulas and speeds up the process
of solving of the game. On the contrary, Ssyft solves the
realizability problem for specifications written in Safety LTL
(see Sec. V for a brief description of the Ssyft tool).
For realizability, we tested all the tools in their sequential
configurations. ltlsynt has two sequential configurations, which
differ on whether the split of actions into Controller’s and
Environment’s ones is performed before or after the determ-
inization. Strix has two sequential modes as well, depending
on the kind of search on the arena (depth-first for the first
configuration and with a priority queue for the second). Ssyft
and ebr-ltl-synth have only one configuration.
Fig. 3 shows the outcomes of the comparison between ebr-
ltl-synth and the best configuration of ltlsynt: it can be clearly
seen that, for both realizable and unrealizable formulas, ltlsynt
presents an exponential blow-up in the solving time that is
avoided by ebr-ltl-synth. Fig. 4 compares ebr-ltl-synth with the
best configuration of Strix: while for realizable formulas there
is an exponential blow up of Strix avoided by ebr-ltl-synth, it
is interesting to note that for the unrealizable benchmarks the
difference between the solving time of the two tools is linear,
mostly showing a 10x improvement in favor of ebr-ltl-synth.
The survival plots for the set of realizable and unrealizable
scalable benchmarks are shown in Figs. 5 and 6, respectively.
The outcomes of the comparison between ebr-ltl-synth and
Ssyft are shown in Fig. 7. Here the three lines near the
sides of the figure correspond to timeouts (the solid black
line), memouts for unrealizable benchmarks and memouts for
realizable benchmarks (the dotted lines). It can be noticed that
Ssyft reaches a memory out for the vast majority of benchmarks.
For instance, on both the realizable categories, Ssyft reaches the
first memout with n = 7. As for the unrealizable benchmarks,
on the third category, Ssyft reaches the first memout with
n = 36, while for the fourth category with n = 59. This is due
to MONA, which is not able to build the (explicit) DFA for the
8Figure 3. ebr-ltl-synth vs ltlsynt (first conf.) on all scalable benchmarks.
Figure 4. ebr-ltl-synth vs Strix on all scalable benchmarks.
(negation of the) initial specification2. This is an important hint
about the use of fully symbolic techniques for the representation
of automata, like the one of ebr-ltl-synth, as in many cases they
can avoid an exponential blowup of the automata’ state space.
The survival plot between ebr-ltl-synth and Ssyft is shown
in Fig. 83. The rest of the plots for realizability of scalable
benchmarks can be found in the appendix.
In addition to these scalable formulas, from the benchmarks
of SYNTCOMP [13], we filtered the formulas that belong to
LTLEBR: this resulted into a set of 29 formulas. The survival
plot showing the comparison with ltlsynt and Strix is shown in
Fig. 9, while the comparison with Ssyft is shown in Fig. 10. It
is interesting to see that, on the SYNTCOMP benchmarks, the
2We point out that in some cases, like in the fourth category for n ≥ 60,
MONA’s memouts are due to its parser.
3The reason why we do not have a single survival plot comparing all the
four tools is that Ssyft could not have been compiled for the same platform as
the others, due to issues with its source code.
Figure 5. Survival plot for realizable scalable benchmarks.
Figure 6. Survival plot for unrealizable scalable benchmarks.
results of ebr-ltl-synth and Ssyft are comparable.
As for the synthesis problem, once a specification is found to
be realizable, all the three tools produce a strategy as a witness:
this strategy is in the form of an and-inverter graph whose
input bits are only the starting uncontrollable variables. Often, a
strategy of this kind can be minimized by using logic synthesis
tools (like ABC [3]) as black-box. In the particular case of
the tools considered in this section, they all use a separate
logic synthesizer as black box, with different configurations
to minimize the strategy. Therefore, we do not compare the
size of the strategies found by the three tools, since such a
comparison would add nothing about the methods implemented
by the tools but would rather compare their backends.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduce the logic LTLEBR, a fragment
of LTL that combines formulas with only bounded operators
and a particular combination of universal unbounded tem-
poral operators. We focus on the realizability and reactive
synthesis problems for this logic. The main contribution is
a fully symbolic translation from any LTLEBR formula to a
deterministic symbolic safety automaton on infinite words. The
process applies a pastification step and a set of rules to reach a
canonical form for LTLEBR formulas. The realizability is then
decided by solving a safety game on the arena represented by
the automaton. We first showed that realizability for LTLEBR
9Figure 7. ebr-ltl-synth vs Ssyft on scalable benchmarks.
Figure 8. Survival plot for ebr-ltl-synth and Ssyft on scalable benchmarks.
belongs to 2EXPTIME, but drops to EXPTIME if no constant
is used. Then, we implemented the proposed procedure in a tool,
whose experimental evaluation revealed very good performance
against tools for realizability and synthesis of full LTL and
Safety LTL specifications.
As a future development of this line of work, we believe
that the translation from LTLEBR to deterministic SSA may
provide many benefits in the context of symbolic model
checking as well, since the search of the state space could
benefit from a deterministic representation of the automaton
for the formula [22]. On the automata construction side, an
interesting development would be to keep the symbolic bounds
during pastification and monitor construction, without, for
instance, expanding Xiα into i nested next operators. On
the expressiveness side, we want to study in which ways
assumptions can be integrated into LTLEBR. Last but not least,
we aim at checking whether the synthesis problem for more
expressive logics, like, for instance, LTL, can be reduced to the
synthesis problem for LTLEBR, for example checking whether
it is possible to use LTLEBR for solving the safety problems
originated from bounded synthesis techniques.
Figure 9. Survival plot for SYNTCOMP benchmarks.
Figure 10. Survival plot for ebr-ltl-synth and Ssyft on SYNTCOMP benchmarks.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proposition 6 (Soundness of pastification): Let ϕ be a
LTLFB formula. For all state sequences σ ∈ (2Σ)ω, all i ∈ N,
and all d ≥ D(φ), it holds that:
σ, i |= ϕ ⇔ σ, i |= XdΠ(ϕ, d)
Proof: The proof goes by structural induction over ϕ.
As the base case, consider a proposition p ∈ Σ, and since
D(p) = 0, consider any d ≥ 0. It holds that σ, i |= p if
and only if σ, i |= XdYdp, which is equivalent to say that
σ, i + d |= Ydp, hence σ, i + d |= Π(p, d). For the inductive
case, we consider multiple cases:
1) if φ ≡ Xφ1, consider any d ≥ D(Xφ1). By the semantics
of the tomorrow operator, σ, i |= Xφ1 is equivalent to
σ, i + 1 |= φ1, which, by the inductive hypothesis, is
equivalent to σ, i + 1 + t |= Π(φ1, t) for all t ≥ D(φ1).
Since D(Xφ1) = D(φ1) + 1, the above is equivalent to
σ, i+ d |= Π(φ1, d− 1), hence σ, i+ d |= Π(Xφ1, d), for
all d ≥ D(Xφ1).
2) if φ ≡ φ1U [a,b]φ2, consider any d ≥ D(φ). The following
equivalences hold:
σ, i |= φ1 U [a,b] φ2
⇔ ∃j ∈ [a, b](σ, i+ j |= φ2∧
∀w ∈ [0, j) . σ, i+ w |= φ1
)
semantics of until
⇔ ∃j ∈ [a, b](σ, i+ j + d− b |= Π(φ2, d− b)∧
∀w ∈ [0, j) . σ, i+ w + d− b |= Π(φ1, d− b))
by the inductive hypothesis,
since D(φ) ≥ D(φ1) and D(φ) ≥ D(φ2)
⇔ ∃t ∈ [0, b− a](σ, i− t+ d |= Π(φ2, d− b)∧
∀w′ ∈ [0, b− t− 1] .
σ, i− t− w′ + d− 1 |= Π(φ1, d− b))
since w′ = b− t− w − 1 and t = b− j
⇔ ∃t ∈ [0, b− a](σ, i+ d |= YtΠ(φ2, d− b)∧
σ, i+ d |= YtH≤b−t−1YΠ(φ1, d− b))
semantics of yesterday and historically
⇔ σ, i+ d |=
b−a∨
t=0
Yt
(
Π(φ2, d− b) ∧ H≤b−t−1YΠ(φ1, d− b)
)
conjunction and disjunction
⇔ σ, i+ d |= Π(φ1 U [a,b] φ2, d)
This concludes the proof.
Proposition 7: Let φ be a LTLFB formula. Then, pastify(φ)
is a formula of size O(n2 ·M log2 n+1), where n = |φ| and M
is the greatest constant in φ.
Proof: We first give a bound for the Π(·) operator. It holds
that:
• |Π(p, d)| = O(p) for each p ∈ Σ;
• |Π(¬φ, d)| = |Π(φ, d)|+ 1;
• |Π(φ1 ∧ φ2, d)| = |Π(φ1, d)|+ |Π(φ2, d)|+ 1;
• |Π(Xφ1, d)| ≤ |Π(φ1, d)|+ 1;
and
|Π(φ1 U [a,b] φ2, d)| ≤ 1 +
M∑
i=0
(i+ |Π(φ2, d− i)|+
(M − i) + |Π(φ1, d− i)|)
≤ 1 +
M∑
i=0
(M + |Π(φ2, d− i)|+
|Π(φ1, d− i)|)
≤ 1 +M2 +M |Π(φ2, d)|+M |Π(φ1, d)|
Since the case for the bounded until operator dominates all
the others, we have that |Π(φ, d)| ≤ 1 +M2 +M |Π(φ2, d)|+
M |Π(φ1, d)|, where |φ| = 1 + |φ1| + |φ2|. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that |φ1| = |φ2| = |φ|−12 ; in this
way, the recurrence equation S(n) describing the space required
for |Π(φ, d)|, with n = |φ|, is the following:
S(n) =
{
O(d) if n = 1
2M · S(n2 ) +O(M2) otherwise
By unrolling the equation for i steps, we have that S(n) =
(2M)i ·S( n2i ) +O(M i). For i = log2 n, the equation amounts
to:
S(n) = (2M)log2 n · S(1) +O(M log2 n)
= d · (2M)log2 n +O(M log2 n)
Since pastify(φ) is defined as XdΠ(φ, d)) where d = D(φ), it
holds that:
pastify(φ) ≤ d+ d · (2M)log2 n +O(M log2 n)
≤Mn+Mn · (2M)log2 n +O(M log2 n)
since d ≤Mn
∈ O(M · n · (2M)log2 n)
∈ O(M · n · 2log2 n ·M log2 n)
∈ O(n2 ·M log2 n+1)
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Lemma 2 (Strong equivalence for the rules): Let ψ, ψ1, ψ2
and ψ3 be LTLFP formulas. For all state sequences σ and for
all positions i ∈ N, it holds that:
R1: σ, i |= X(ψ1 ∧ ψ2)⇔ σ, i |= Xψ1 ∧ Xψ2
R2: σ, i |= ψR (ψ1 ∧ ψ2)⇔ σ, i |= ψR ψ1 ∧ ψR ψ2
R3: σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R (Xjψ2)⇔
σ, i |=
{
Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−jψ2)) if i > j
Xj((Yj−iψ1)R ψ2) otherwise
R4: σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R (Xj(ψ2 R ψ3))⇔
σ, i |=

Xi(ψ1 R ((Yi−jψ2)R (Yi−jψ3)))
if i > j
Xj((Yj−i(ψ1 ∧ >))R (ψ2 R ψ3))
otherwise
R5: σ, i |= GXiGψ ⇔ σ, i |= XiGψ
R6: σ, i |= GXi(ψ1 R ψ2)⇔ σ, i |= XiGψ2
R7: (Xiψ1)R (XjGψ2)⇔
σ, i |=
{
XiGYi−jψ2 if i > j
XjGψ2 otherwise
Rflat: σ, 0 |= Xi(ψ1 R (ψ2 R (. . . (ψn−1 R ψn) . . . ))) ⇔
σ, 0 |= Xi((ψn−1∧O(ψn−2∧ . . .O(ψ1∧Yi>) . . . )))R
ψn) ∀n ≥ 3
Proof: Before starting the proof, we remark that the claim
of this lemma not only asks for proving the equivalence
between the left- and the right-hand side of the rules, but
requires to prove the strong equivalence between the two, i.e.,
that for all the state sequences σ and for all the positions i, σ
is a model starting from position i of the left-hand formula
iff σ is a model starting from position i of the right-hand
formula. Equivalence is a special case of strong equivalence by
considering only i = 0. In our case, the necessity of considering
strong equivalence is due to the fact that the left-hand side
of the rules (except for Rflat, for which we require only the
equivalence) can appear as subformulas of the original φ on
which we apply the canonize algorithm, and thus it can be
interpreted potentially on any position i. Since we want to
maintain the equivalence between φ and canonize(φ), we have
to make sure that each subformulas is strongly equivalent to the
one by which it is replaced during the applications of the rules.
The only exception is the Rflat rule, which is applied only to
top-level conjuncts or disjuncts, and thus we can require for it
to maintain only the equivalence.
Initially we prove the first two points (i.e., R1 and R2). For
the R1 rule, the following steps hold:
σ, i |= X(ψ1 ∧ ψ2)
⇔ σ, i+ 1 |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2
⇔ σ, i+ 1 |= ψ1 ∧ σ, i+ 1 |= ψ2
⇔ σ, i |= Xψ1 ∧ σ, i |= Xψ2
⇔ σ, i |= Xψ1 ∧ Xψ2
Consider rule R2. We first prove that σ, s |= ψ R (φ1 ∧ φ2)
implies σ, s |= ψR φ1 ∧ψR φ2, for all state sequences σ and
for all positions s. Let σ be a state sequence and let s ∈ N be
a position such that σ, s |= ψR (φ1 ∧ φ2). We divide in cases:
1) if ∀i ≥ s.(σ, i |= φ1 ∧ φ2), then ∀i ≥ s.σ, i |= φ1 and
∀i ≥ s.σ, i |= φ2. Thus, σ, s |= ψRφ1 and σ, s |= ψRφ2,
that is σ, s |= ψR φ1 ∧ ψR φ2.
2) if ∃i ≥ s.(σ, i |= ψ ∧ ∀s ≤ j ≤ i.σ, j |= (φ1 ∧ φ2))
⇔ ∃i ≥ s.(σ, i |= ψ ∧ ∀s ≤ j ≤ i.(σ, j |= φ1)∧
∀s ≤ k ≤ i.(σ, k |= φ2))
⇒ ∃i ≥ s.(σ, i |= ψ ∧ ∀s ≤ j ≤ i.(σ, j |= φ1))∧
∃i ≥ s.(σ, i |= ψ ∧ ∀0 ≤ j ≤ i.(σ, j |= φ2))
⇔ σ, s |= ψR φ1 ∧ ψR φ2
We now prove the opposite direction, that is σ, s |= ψR φ1 ∧
ψR φ2 implies σ, s |= ψR (φ1 ∧ φ2), for all state sequences
σ and for all positions s. Let σ be a state sequence and let
s ∈ N such that σ, s |= ψR φ1 ∧ ψR φ2. We divide again in
cases:
1) if ∀i ≥ s.(σ, i |= φ1) ∧ ∀i ≥ s.(σ, j |= φ2), then ∀i ≥
s.(σ, i |= φ1 ∧ φ2) and thus σ, s |= ψR (φ1 ∧ φ2).
2) if ∀i ≥ s.(σ, i |= φ1) and ∃i ≥ s.(σ, i |= ψ ∧ ∀s ≤ j ≤
i.σ, j |= φ2), then ∃i ≥ s(σ, i |= ψ ∧ ∀s ≤ j ≤ i.σ, j |=
(φ1 ∧ φ2)), that is σ, s |= ψR (φ1 ∧ φ2).
3) if ∃i ≥ s.(σ, i |= ψ ∧ ∀s ≤ j ≤ i.σ, j |= φ1) and ∀i ≥
s.(σ, i |= φ2), then ∃i ≥ s.(σ, i |= ψ∧∀s ≤ j ≤ i.σ, k |=
φ1 ∧ φ2), that is σ, s |= ψR (φ1 ∧ φ2).
4) consider the case such that ∃l ≥ s.(σ, l |= ψ ∧ ∀s ≤
j ≤ l.σ, j |= φ1) and ∃k ≥ s.(σ, k |= ψ ∧ ∀s ≤ j ≤
k.σ, j |= φ2). Let i = min(l, k): then σ, i |= φ and
∀s ≤ j ≤ i.(σ, j |= φ1∧φ2), that is σ, s |= ψR(φ1∧φ2).
This concludes the proof for the R2 rule.
Before proving the cases of the remaining rules, we define
and prove the following auxiliary strong equivalences. For all
state sequences σ and for all positions i, it holds that:
R1: σ, i |= ψ1 R (Xiψ2) ⇔ σ, i |= Xi((Yiψ1)R ψ2)
R2: σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R ψ2 ⇔ σ, i |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yiψ2))
R3: σ, i |= YiXiψ ⇔ σ, i |= ψ ∧ Yi>
R4: σ, i |= Yi(ψ1 R ψ2) ⇔ σ, i |= (Yiψ1)R (Yiψ2)
R5: σ, i |= GGψ ⇔ σ, i |= Gψ
R6: σ, i |= G(ψ1 R ψ2) ⇔ σ, i |= Gψ2
R7: σ, i |= ψ1 R (Gψ2) ⇔ σ, i |= Gψ2
These will help proving the cases for R3-R7.
Consider the case for rule R1. We first prove that σ, s |=
ψ1 R (Xiψ2) implies σ, s |= Xi((Yiψ1) R ψ2), for all state
sequences σ and all positions s. Let σ be a state sequence and
let s ∈ N such that σ, s |= ψ1 R (Xiψ2). We divide in cases:
1) if ∀j ≥ s.σ, j |= Xiψ2, then
⇔ ∀j ≥ s+ i.σ, j |= ψ2
⇒ σ, s+ i |= (Yiψ1)R ψ2
⇔ σ, s |= Xi((Yiψ1)R ψ2)
2) if ∃j ≥ s.(σ, j |= ψ1 ∧ ∀s ≤ k ≤ j.σ, k |= Xiψ2), then
∃j ≥ s.(σ, j+ i |= Yiψ1∧∀s+ i ≤ k ≤ j+ i.σ, k |= ψ2),
which in turn means that σ, s+ i |= (Yiψ1)R ψ2, that is
σ, s |= Xi((Yiψ1)R ψ2).
13
We now prove the opposite direction, that is σ, s |=
Xi((Yiψ1) R ψ2) implies σ, s |= ψ1 R (Xiψ2), for all state
sequences σ and all positions s. Let σ be a state sequence and
let s ∈ N such that σ, s |= Xi((Yiψ1)R ψ2). We divide again
in cases:
1) if ∀j ≥ s + i.(σ, j |= ψ2), then ∀j ≥ s.(σ, j |= Xiψ2)
and thus σ |= ψ1 R (Xiψ2).
2) if ∃j ≥ s+ i.(σ, j |= Yiψ1 ∧ ∀s+ i ≤ k ≤ j.σ, k |= ψ2),
then:
⇔ ∃j ≥ s+ i.(σ, j − i |= XiYiψ1 ∧ ∀s ≤ k ≤ j − i.
σ, k |= Xiψ2)
⇔ ∃j ≥ s+ i.(σ, j − i |= ψ1 ∧ ∀s ≤ k ≤ j − i.σ, k |= Xiψ2)
⇔ σ, s+ i |= Yi(ψ1 R (Xiψ2))
⇔ σ, s |= ψ1 R (Xiψ2)
This concludes the proof for the rule R1. The proof for the
R2 rule is specular.
Consider the R3 case. We first prove that σ, s |= YiXiψ
implies σ, s |= ψ ∧ Yi>, for all state sequences σ and all
positions s. Let σ be a state sequence such that σ, s |= YiXiψ
for a given s ∈ N. We divide in cases:
(i) if s < i, then σ, s 6|= YiXiψ, but this is a contradiction
with our hypothesis;
(ii) then it has to be the case that s ≥ i. It holds that:
σ, s |= YiXiψ
⇔ σ, s− i |= Xiψ
⇔ σ, s− i+ i |= ψ
⇔ σ, s |= ψ ∧ Yi> since s ≥ i
We prove the opposite direction, that is σ, s |= ψ∧Yi> implies
σ, s |= YiXiψ, for all state sequences σ and all positions s.
Let σ be a state sequence such that σ, s |= ψ∧Yi> for a given
s ∈ N. We divide in cases:
(i) if s < i, then σ, s 6|= Yi>, but this is a contradiction with
our hypothesis;
(ii) then it has to be the case that s ≥ i. It holds that:
σ, s |= ψ ∧ Yi>
⇔ σ, s− i |= Xiψ since s ≥ i
⇔ σ, s− i+ i |= YiXiψ
⇔ σ, s |= YiXiψ
This concludes the proof for R3.
Consider now the R4 case. We first prove the left-to-right
direction, that is σ, s |= Yi(ψ1Rψ2) implies σ, s |= (Yiψ1)R
(Yiψ2), for all state sequences σ and all positions s. Let σ
be a state sequence such that σ, s |= Yi(ψ1 R ψ2) with s ≥ i
(obviously, it can’t be that s < i). It holds that σ, s − i |=
ψ1Rψ2. Now, we divide in cases:
1) if ∀k ≥ s − i.σ, k |= ψ2, then ∀k ≥ s.σ, k |= Yiψ2 and
thus σ, s |= (Yiψ1)R (Yiψ2).
2) if ∃k ≥ s − i.(σ, k |= ψ2 ∧ ∀s − i ≤ l ≤ k.σ, l |= ψ1),
then ∃k ≥ s.(σ, k |= Yiψ2 ∧ ∀s ≤ l ≤ k.σ, l |= Yiψ1),
and thus σ, s |= (Yiψ1)R (Yiψ2).
Now we prove the opposite direction. Suppose that σ, s |=
(Yiψ1)R (Yiψ2) where s ≥ i. We divide in cases:
1) if ∀k ≥ s.σ, k |= Yiψ2, then:
∀k ≥ s− i.σ, k |= ψ2
⇔ σ, s− i |= ψ1 R ψ2
⇔ σ, s |= Yi(ψ1 R ψ2)
2) if ∃k ≥ s.(σ, k |= Yiψ1 ∧∀k ≤ l ≤ k.σ, l |= Yiψ2), then:
∃k ≥ s− i.(σ, k |= ψ1 ∧ ∀s− i ≤ l ≤ k.σ, l |= ψ2)
⇔ σ, s− i |= ψ1 R ψ2
⇔ σ, s |= Yi(ψ1 R ψ2)
This concludes the proof for the R4 case.
The case for R5 is simple, and it consists in the following
steps. For all state sequences σ and for all positions s, it holds
that:
σ, s |= GGψ
⇔ ∀i ≥ s.σ, i |= Gψ
⇔ ∀i ≥ s.∀j ≥ i.σ, j |= ψ
⇔ ∀i ≥ s.σ, i |= ψ
⇔ σ, s |= Gψ
Consider the R6 strong equivalence. We first prove the left-
to-right direction. Suppose that σ, s |= G(ψ1 R ψ2), for a
given state sequence σ and a given position s. It holds that
∀i ≥ s.σ, i |= ψ1 R ψ2. We divide in cases, depending on the
semantics of the release operator:
1) if ∀i ≥ s.∀j ≥ i.σ, j |= ψ2. In this case we have that
∀i ≥ s.σ, i |= ψ2, that is σ, s |= Gψ2.
2) otherwise, ∀i ≥ s.∃j ≥ i.(σ, j |= ψ1∧∀i ≤ k ≤ j.σ, k |=
ψ2). In particular, for k = i, we have that ∀i ≥ s.σ, i |=
ψ2, that is σ, s |= Gψ2.
We prove the right-to-left direction for the R6 case. Suppose
that σ, s |= Gψ2, for a given state sequence σ and position s.
It holds that:
σ, s |= Gψ2
⇔ ∀i ≥ s.σ, i |= ψ2
⇔ ∀i ≥ s.∀j ≥ i.σ, j |= ψ2
⇒ ∀i ≥ s.σ, i |= ψ1 R ψ2
⇔ σ, s |= G(ψ1 R ψ2)
Finally, consider the case for the R7 strong equivalence. We first
prove the left-to-right direction. Suppose that σ, s |= ψ1R(Gψ2)
for a given state sequence σ and position s. We divide in cases,
depending on the semantics of the release operator:
1) if ∀i ≥ s.σ, i |= Gψ2, then for i = s we have that
σ, s |= Gψ2.
2) otherwise, ∃i ≥ s.(σ, i |= ψ1 ∧ ∀s ≤ j ≤ i.σ, j |= Gψ2).
In particular, for j = s, σ, s |= Gψ2.
Therefore, in both cases we have that σ, s |= Gψ2. For the
right-to-left direction, suppose that σ, s |= Gψ2. Then, ∀i ≥
s.σ, i |= Gψ2. This implies that σ, s |= ψ1 R (Gψ2). This
concludes the proof of all the auxiliary strong equivalences.
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We can now prove the remaining rules R3-R7. Consider
first R3 in the case i > j: we have to prove that σ, s |=
(Xiψ1)R (Xjψ2) ⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1R (Yi−jψ2)), for all states
sequences σ and all positions s. This can be simply done by
means of the auxiliary rules R2 and R3:
σ, s |= (Xiψ1)R (Xjψ2)
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (YiXjψ2)) by rule R2
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−j(YjXjψ2)))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−j(ψ2 ∧ Yj>))) by rule R3
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−jψ2 ∧ Yi−j+j>))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−jψ2 ∧ Yi>))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−jψ2))
Consider now the rule R3 in the case i ≤ j. We have to prove
that σ, s |= (Xiψ1)R (Xjψ2) ⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−iψ1)R ψ2).
This can be done using the auxiliary equivalences R1 and R3:
σ, s |= (Xiψ1)R (Xjψ2)
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((YjXiψ1)R ψ2) by rule R1
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−i(YiXiψ1))R ψ2)
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−i(ψ1 ∧ Yi>))R ψ2) by rule R3
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−iψ1 ∧ Yj−i+i>)R ψ2)
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−iψ1 ∧ Yj>)R ψ2)
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−iψ1)R ψ2)
Consider the R4 rule in the case i > j. It holds that:
σ |= (Xiψ1)R (Xj(ψ2 R ψ3))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (YiXj(ψ2 R ψ3)))
by rule R2
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−jYjXj(ψ2 R ψ3)))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−j(ψ2 R ψ3 ∧ Yj>)))
by rule R3
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−j(ψ2 R ψ3) ∧ Yi>))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−j(ψ2 R ψ3))) ∧ Xi(ψ1 R Yi>)
by rule R1
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−j(ψ2 R ψ3)))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R ((Yi−jψ2)R (Yi−jψ3)))
by rule R4
Finally, consider the R4 rule in the case i ≤ j. It holds that:
σ |= (Xiψ1)R (Xj(ψ2 R ψ3))
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((YjXiψ1)R (ψ2 R ψ3)) by rule R1
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−iYiXiψ1)R (ψ2 R ψ3))
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−i(ψ1 ∧ Yi>))R (ψ2 R ψ3)) by rule R3
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−iψ1 ∧ Yj>)R (ψ2 R ψ3))
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−iψ1)R (ψ2 R ψ3))
Consider the R5 rule. It can be proved by means of the rules R4
and R5 as follows. For all state sequences σ and all positions
s, it holds that:
σ, s |= GXiGψ
⇔ σ, s |= (X0⊥)R (Xi(⊥R ψ))
by definition of globally operator
⇔ σ, s |= Xi((Yi⊥)R (⊥R ψ)) by rule R4
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(⊥R (⊥R ψ))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(GGψ)
⇔ σ, s |= XiGψ by rule R5
Consider the R6 rule. It can be prove by means of the rules
R4 and R6 as follows. For all state sequences σ and positions
s it holds that:
σ, s |= GXi(ψ1 R ψ2)
⇔ σ, s |= ((X0⊥)R (Xi(ψ1 R ψ2)))
by definition of globally operator
⇔ σ, s |= Xi((Yi⊥)R (ψ1 R ψ2)) by rule R4
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(⊥R (ψ1 R ψ2))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(G(ψ1 R ψ2))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(Gψ2) by rule R6
Consider the R7 rule. It can be proved by means of the rules
R4 and R7 as follows. Let σ be a state sequence and let s be
a position. We divide in cases. If i > j, then:
σ, s |= (Xiψ1)R (XjGψ2)
⇔ σ, s |= (Xiψ1)R (Xj(⊥R ψ2))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R ((Yi−j⊥)R (Yi−jψ2))) by rule R4
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (⊥R (Yi−jψ2)))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (G(Yi−jψ2)))
⇔ σ, s |= Xi(ψ1 R (G(Yi−jψ2))) by rule R7
⇔ σ, s |= XiGYi−jψ2
Otherwise, it holds that i ≤ j and:
σ, s |= (Xiψ1)R (XjGψ2)
⇔ σ, s |= (Xiψ1)R (Xj(⊥R ψ2))
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−iψ1)R (⊥R ψ2)) by rule R4
⇔ σ, s |= Xj((Yj−iψ1)R (Gψ2))
⇔ σ, s |= XjGψ2 by rule R7
This concludes the case for the rules R1-R7.
It remains the case for the Rflat rule, for which we have to
prove only equivalence. We first prove the left-to-right direction,
for all n ≥ 3. Suppose that:
σ, 0 |= Xi(ψ1 R (ψ2 R (. . . (ψn−1 R ψn) . . . )))
σ, i |= ψ1 R (ψ2 R (. . . (ψn−1 R ψn) . . . ))
This formula contains exactly n release operators. Each of
these can be satisfied in two ways: (i) universally, that is if for
all the future positions the right-hand side formula holds, or
(ii) existentially, if there exists a position in the future where the
left-hand side formula holds and the right-hand side formula
holds until then. Therefore, we have a total of 2n−1 cases.
We consider first the cases in which there exists a release
operator that is universally satisfied. These correspond to
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2n−1 − 1 cases. Let m be the index of the outermost between
these operators. Let k1 = i. We have that:
∃j1 ≥ k1.(σ, j1 |= ψ1 ∧ ∀k1 ≤ k2 ≤ j1.
∃j2 ≥ k2.(σ, j2 |= ψ2 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀km−1 ≤ km−1 ≤ jm−2.
∀km ≥ km−1.(σ, km |= ψm R (. . . (ψn−1 R ψn) . . . ))) . . . )
Which is equivalent to:
∃j1 ≥ k1.(σ, j1 |= ψ1 ∧ ∀k1 ≤ k2 ≤ j1.
∃j2 ≥ k2.(σ, j2 |= ψ2 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀km−1 ≤ km−1 ≤ jm−2.
(σ, km−1 |= G(ψm R (. . . (ψn−1 R ψn) . . . ))) . . . ))
By the repeated application of the R6 auxiliary rule n −m
times, we have that:
∃j1 ≥ k1.(σ, j1 |= ψ1 ∧ ∀k1 ≤ k2 ≤ j1.
∃j2 ≥ k2.(σ, j2 |= ψ2 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀km−1 ≤ km−1 ≤ jm−2.
(σ, km−1 |= Gψn) . . . ))
that is:
∃j1 ≥ k1.(σ, j1 |= ψ1 ∧ ∀k1 ≤ k2 ≤ j1.
∃j2 ≥ k2.(σ, j2 |= ψ2 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀km−1 ≤ km−1 ≤ jm−2.
∀k ≥ km−1.(σ, k |= ψn) . . . ))
In particular, for k1 = k2 = · · · = km−2 = km−1, we have
that:
∀k ≥ k1.σ, k |= ψn
Since by definition k1 = i, we have that ∀k ≥ i.σ, k |= ψn, and
thus σ, 0 |= Xi((ψn−1∧O(ψn−2∧. . .O(ψ1∧Yi>)))Rψn). The
remaining case is when all the release operators are existentially
satisfied. Suppose that:
∃j1 ≥ k1.(σ, j1 |= ψ1 ∧ ∀k1 ≤ k2 ≤ j1.
∃j2 ≥ k2.(σ, j2 |= ψ2 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀kn−1 ≤ kn−1 ≤ jn−2.
∃jn−1 ≥ kn−1.(σ, jn−1 |= ψn−1 ∧ ∀kn−1 ≤ kn ≤ jn−1.
σ, kn |= ψn)) . . . )
where k1 = i. This implies that:
∃j1 ≥ i.(σ, j1 |= ψ1∧
∃j2 ≥ j1.(σ, j2 |= ψ2 ∧ · · · ∧
∃jn−1 ≥ jn−2.(σ, jn−1 |= ψn−1 ∧ ∀i ≤ k ≤ jn−1.
σ, k |= ψn) . . . ))
This is equivalent to:
∃jn−1 ≥ i.(σ, jn−1 |= ψn−1∧
∃i ≤ jn−2 ≤ jn−1.(σ, jn−2 |= ψn−2 ∧ · · · ∧
∃i ≤ j1 ≤ j2.(σ, j1 |= ψ1) . . . )∧
∀i ≤ k ≤ jn−1.σ, k |= ψn)
This in turn is equivalent to:
∃jn−1 ≥ i.(σ, jn−1 |= ψn−1∧
∃0 ≤ jn−2 ≤ jn−1.(σ, jn−2 |= ψn−2 ∧ · · · ∧
∃0 ≤ j1 ≤ j2.(σ, j1 |= ψ1 ∧ Yi>) . . . )∧
∀i ≤ k ≤ jn−1.σ, k |= ψn)
This is the definition of the existential semantics of the formula
(ψn−1 ∧ O(ψn−2 ∧ . . .O(ψ1 ∧ Yi>))) R ψn, starting from
position i. Therefore, σ, 0 |= Xi((ψn−1∧O(ψn−2∧ . . .O(ψ1∧
Yi>)))R ψn).
We now prove the right-to-left direction for Rflat. Suppose
that σ, 0 |= Xi((ψn−1 ∧ O(ψn−2 ∧ . . .O(ψ1 ∧ Yi>)))R ψn).
Therefore, σ, i |= (ψn−1 ∧O(ψn−2 ∧ . . .O(ψ1 ∧Yi>)))Rψn.
We divide in cases:
1) if ∀j ≥ i. σ, j |= ψn, then
σ, 0 |= Xi(ψ1 R (ψ2 R (. . . (ψn−1 R ψn) . . . )))
2) otherwise, ∃j ≥ i.(σ, j |= ψn−1 ∧ O(ψn−2 ∧ . . .O(ψ1 ∧
Yi>) . . . ) ∧ ∀i ≤ k ≤ j.σ, k |= ψn).
With the former case, we are done. Instead, the latter is
equivalent to:
∃jn−1 ≥ i.(σ, jn−1 |= ψn−1∧
∃0 ≤ jn−2 ≤ jn−1.(σ, jn−2 |= ψn−2 ∧ . . .
∃0 ≤ j1 ≤ j2.(σ, j1 |= (ψ1 ∧ Yi>)) . . . )∧
∀i ≤ k ≤ jn−1.σ, k |= ψn)
In turn, this is equivalent to:
∃jn−1 ≥ i.(σ, jn−1 |= ψn−1∧
∃i ≤ jn−2 ≤ jn−1.(σ, jn−2 |= ψn−2 ∧ . . .
∃i ≤ j1 ≤ j2.(σ, j1 |= ψ1) . . . )∧
∀i ≤ k ≤ jn−1.σ, k |= ψn)
This is equivalent to:
∃j1 ≥ i.(σ, j1 |= ψ1∧
∃j2 ≥ j1.(σ, j2 |= ψ2 ∧ . . .
∃jn−1 ≥ jn−2.(σ, jn−1 |= ψn−1) . . . )∧
∀i ≤ k ≤ j1.σ, k |= ψn)
which implies that:
∃j1 ≥ i.(σ, j1 |= ψ1 ∧ ∀i ≤ k1 ≤ j1.
∃j2 ≥ j1.(σ, j2 |= ψ2 ∧ · · · ∧ ∀kn−2 ≤ kn−1 ≤ jn−1.
∃jn−1 ≥ jn−2.(σ, jn−1 |= ψn−1 ∧ ∀kn−1 ≤ k ≤ jn−1.
σ, k |= ψn) . . . ))
This is the definition of the existential semantics of the formula
ψ1 R (ψ2 R (. . . (ψn−1 R ψn) . . . )), starting from position i.
Therefore, σ, 0 |= Xi(ψ1R(ψ2R(. . . (ψn−1Rψn) . . . ))). This
concludes the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3: Let ψ1, ψ2 and ψ3 be LTLFP formulas. Let φ
be a formula of type Xjψ2, XjGψ2 or Xj(ψ2R ψ3). For each
state sequence σ and position i, it holds that:
1) σ, i |= Gφ ⇔ σ, i |= resolve_globally(φ)
2) σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R φ ⇔
σ, i |= resolve_release(Xiψ1, φ)
Proof: We prove the second point, for the release oper-
ator. The subroutine resolve_release divides in cases,
depending on the structure of φ:
• if φ = Xjψ2 and i > j, then:
resolve_release(Xiψ1,X
jψ2) :=
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Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−jψ2))
By rule R3 of Lemma 2, we have that σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R
φ⇔ σ, i |= resolve_release(Xiψ1, φ).
• if φ = Xjψ2 and i ≤ j, then
resolve_release(Xiψ1,X
jψ2) :=
Xj((Yj−iψ1)R ψ2)
By rule R3 of Lemma 2, we have that σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R
φ⇔ σ, i |= resolve_release(Xiψ1, φ).
• if φ = Xj(ψ2 R ψ3) and i > j, then
resolve_release(Xiψ1,X
j(ψ2 R ψ3)) :=
Xi(ψ1 R ((Yi−jψ2)R (Yi−jψ3)))
By rule R4 of Lemma 2, we have that σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R
φ⇔ σ, i |= resolve_release(Xiψ1, φ).
• if φ = Xj(ψ2 R ψ3) and i ≤ j, then
resolve_release(Xiψ1,X
j(ψ2 R ψ3)) :=
Xj((Yj−iψ1)R (ψ2 R ψ3))
By rule R4 of Lemma 2, we have that σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R
φ⇔ σ, i |= resolve_release(Xiψ1, φ).
• if φ = XjGψ2 and i > j, then
resolve_release(Xiψ1,X
jGψ2) :=
XiGYi−jψ2
By rule R7 of Lemma 2, we have that σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R
φ⇔ σ, i |= resolve_release(Xiψ1, φ).
• if φ = XjGψ2 and i ≤ j, then
resolve_release(Xiψ1,X
jGψ2) :=
XjGψ2
By rule R7 of Lemma 2, we have that σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R
φ⇔ σ, i |= resolve_release(Xiψ1, φ).
The case for resolve_globally(φ) is analogous.
Lemma 4 (Soundness of applyR1R7(·)): For any
PastLTLEBR formula φ, for any state sequence σ and for any
position i, it holds that σ, i |= φ iff σ, i |= applyR1R7(φ).
Proof: Consider the pseudo-code of applyR1R7(·) as
described in Fig. 19. We prove this claim by induction on
the complexity of formula φ.
The base case corresponds to the case when φ is a LTLFP
formula. In this case, the applyR1R7(·) algorithm returns φ it
self. Obviously, φ is strongly equivalent to applyR1R7(φ)
For the inductive step, we divide in cases. If φ := Xφ1,
then σ, i + 1 |= φ1. By inductive hypothesis σ′, i′ |= φ1 iff
σ′, i′ |= applyR1R7(φ1), for all state sequences σ′ and positions
i′. Therefore:
σ, i |= Xφ1 ⇔σ, i+ 1 |= φ1
⇔σ, i+ 1 |= applyR1R7(φ1)
by inductive hypothesis
⇔σ, i |= X(applyR1R7(φ1))
In general, applyR1R7(φ1) is a conjunction of formulas of type
Xjψ, XjGψ, Xj((Xkψ1)R ψ2), that is:
applyR1R7(φ1) := φ
c
2 ∧ · · · ∧ φcn
and thus:
σ, i |= Xφ1 ⇔σ, i |= X(φc2 ∧ · · · ∧ φcn)
Using rule R1 of Lemma 2, we have that:
σ, i |= Xφ1 ⇔ σ, i |= X(φc2 ∧ · · · ∧ φcn)
⇔ σ, i |= Xφc2 ∧ · · · ∧ Xφcn
by rule R1 of Lemma 2
σ, i |= φ⇔ σ, i |= applyR1R7(φ)
This concludes the case for φ := Xφ1. Consider the case
φ := (Xiψ1)R φ1. Since by inductive hypothesis σ′, i′ |= φ1
iff σ′, i′ |= applyR1R7(φ1), for all state sequences σ′ and
positions i′, we have that:
σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R φ1 ⇔σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R (applyR1R7(φ1))
σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R (φc2 ∧ · · · ∧ φcn)
where φci is a formula of type X
jψ, XjGψ, Xj((Xkψ1)R ψ2),
for each 1 < i ≤ n. By rule R2 of Lemma 2, we have that:
σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R φ1 ⇔ σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R (φc2 ∧ · · · ∧ φcn)
⇔ σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R (φc2) ∧ · · · ∧
(Xiψ1)R (φcn)
Let φri ≡ resolve_release(Xiψ1, φci ), for all 1 < i ≤ n.
By Lemma 3:
σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R φ1 ⇔ σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R (φc2) ∧ · · · ∧
(Xiψ1)R (φcn)
⇔ σ, i |= (Xiψ1)R (φr2) ∧ · · · ∧
(Xiψ1)R (φrn)
by Lemma 3
⇔ σ, i |= applyR1R7(φ)
by definition of applyR1R7
This concludes the case for φ := φ := (Xiψ1)R φ1. The case
for the globally operator is analogous to the proof for the
release one.
Lemma 5 (Soundness of flatten(·)): For any PastLTLEBR
formula φ, it holds that φ ≡ flatten(φ).
Proof: We prove this lemma by induction on the number
n of top-level conjucts or disjuncts. The base case corresponds
to the case of n = 0. We divide in cases:
• if φ := Xi(ψ1 R (ψ2 R (. . . (ψn−1 R ψn) . . . ))),
then flatten(φ) := Xi((ψn−1 ∧ O(ψn−2 ∧ . . .O(ψ1 ∧
Yi>) . . . )) R ψn). By the Rflat rule of Lemma 2,
φ ≡ flatten(φ).
• otherwise, the flatten algorithm falls in the default case.
In this case, flatten(φ) := φ, and obviously φ ≡ flatten(φ).
For the inductive step, we divide in cases as well.
• if φ := φ1 ∧ φ2, then by inductive hypothesis φ1 ≡
flatten(φ1) and φ2 ≡ flatten(φ2). Thus φ ≡ flatten(φ1) ∧
flatten(φ2), that is φ ≡ flatten(φ).
• if φ := φ1 ∧ φ2, then by inductive hypothesis φ1 ≡
flatten(φ1) and φ2 ≡ flatten(φ2). Thus φ ≡ flatten(φ1) ∨
flatten(φ2), that is φ ≡ flatten(φ).
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Lemma 6 (Soundness of canonize(·)): For any PastLTLEBR
formula φ, it holds that φ and canonize(φ) are equivalent and
canonize(φ) is a Canonical PastLTLEBR formula.
Proof: We define canonize(φ) as the formula
flatten(applyR1R7(φ)), where applyR1R7 is the algorithm
in Fig. 19 and flatten is the algorithm in Fig. 21. By
Lemma 4, for each state sequence σ and position i, we
have that σ, i |= φ iff σ, i |= applyR1R7(φ). In particular,
for i = 0, this means that φ ≡ applyR1R7(φ). By Lemma 5,
we have that flatten(applyR1R7(φ)) ≡ applyR1R7(φ),
and thus φ ≡ flatten(applyR1R7(φ)), and by definition
φ ≡ canonize(φ).
Finally, it is easy to see that all the rules of Lemma 2, except
for R4, replace a formula with a one in Canonical PastLTLEBR.
Thus canonize(φ) would be a Canonical PastLTLEBR formula
if we did not consider the nested release operators. Since
this is exactly the case solved by the Rflat rule and thus by
the flatten algorithm (which produces a formula in canonical
form), we have that flatten(applyR1R7(φ)), which by definition
is canonize(φ), is in Canonical PastLTLEBR.
Proposition 8 (Complexity of canonize(·)): For any
PastLTLEBR formula φ, canonize(φ) can be built in O(n) time,
and the size of canonize(φ) is O(n), where n = |φ|.
Proof: Since canonize(φ) := flatten(applyR1R7(φ)), we
study the complexity of both applyR1R7 and flatten. At each
iteration, algorithm applyR1R7(φ) makes at most one recursive
call on a formula φ′ of size |φ′| < |φ| and thus it stop at
most after O(n) iterations. The same holds for flatten. At each
iteration, applyR1R7 and flatten produce a formula of constant
size with respect to the size of the formula produced by the
recursive call; therefore the recurrence equation describing the
size of the formula produced by canonize(φ) is:
S(n) =
{
O(1) if n = 1
S(n− 1) +O(1) otherwise
Therefore:
S(n) = S(n− 1− i) + i · O(i)
= S(1) +O(n) for i = n− 2
∈ O(n)
Lemma 7: For each canonical PastLTLEBR formula φ, for
each LTLFP formula α ∈ LTLFP and for each i ≥ 0, σ(i) |= α
iff τ(i) |= vα, where τ is the trace of A(φ) induced by σ.
Proof: We prove the lemma by induction on the structure
of α. For the base case, σ(i) |= p ∈ Σ iff τ(i) |= vp; since by
definition of its monitor vp ⇔ p, we have that σ(i) |= p iff
τ(i) |= p; since τ is induced by σ, this is always true.
For the inductive step, consider first α∨ β. If σ(i) |= α∨ β,
then either σ(i) |= α or σ(i) |= β; by inductive hypothesis,
either τ(i) |= vα or τ(i) |= vβ ; finally, by the definition of
the monitor for disjunction, we have that τ(i) |= vα∨β . The
opposite case and the case for ¬α can be proved similarly.
Consider the case for Yα. If σ(i) |= Yα, then σ(i− 1) |= α
and i > 0. By inductive hypothesis τ(i− 1) |= vα and i > 0;
by definition of the monitor for Yα, τ(i) |= vYα.
Finally, we prove the case for α S β. If σ(i) |= α S β,
then either σ(i) |= β or σ(i) |= α ∧ Y(α S β); by inductive
hypothesis, either τ(i) |= vβ or τ(i) |= vα ∧ vY(αSβ); by
definition of the monitor for αS β, we have that τ(i) |= vαSβ .
The opposite direction can be proved in the specular way.
Proposition 9: Let φ be a canonical PastLTLEBR formula,
with |φ| = n. Then, there exists a deterministic SSA of size
O(n) that accepts the same language.
Proof: Let φ be a canonical PastLTLEBR formula over the
alphabet Σ and let A(φ) = (X∪Σ, I(X), T (X,Σ, X ′), G(X))
be the deterministic symbolic safety automaton as previously
defined.
Soundness. We first prove that L(φ) = L(A(φ)). In particu-
lar we prove that ∀σ ∈ L(φ).σ |= φ iff τ(i) |= S(X) ∀i ≥ 0,
where τ is the trace induced by σ in A(φ). Recall that
S(X) = φ[ϕ/¬errorϕ]. We proceed by induction on the
structure of φ.
For the base case we consider φ = XiGα where α ∈
LTLFP(the cases for Xiα and Xi(α R β) are similar). If
σ |= XiGα then σ(i) |= Gα, that is σ(j) |= α ∀j ≥ i. By
Lemma 7, τ(j) |= vα ∀j ≥ i. The following points hold:
1) given the first condition in the monitor for XiGα, we have
that τ(j) |= ¬errorφ ∀0 ≤ j < i;
2) given the previous point and the fact that τ(j) |= vα ∀j ≥
i, by the second condition of the monitor we have that
τ(j) |= ¬errorφ ∀j ≥ i.
By these two points, it follows that τ(j) |= ¬errorφ ∀j ≥ 0.
Viceversa, if τ(j) |= ¬errorφ ∀j ≥ 0, then by definition of
the monitor we have that τ(j) |= vα ∀j ≥ i. By Lemma 7,
σ(j) |= α ∀j ≥ i, that is σ |= XiGα.
For the inductive step, consider first φ = φ1 ∧ φ2. If σ |= φ,
then σ |= φ1 and σ |= φ2. By inductive hypothesis, τ(i) |=
φ1[ϕ/¬errorϕ] ∀i ≥ 0 and τ(i) |= φ2[ϕ/¬errorϕ] ∀i ≥ 0,
that is τ(i) |= (φ1 ∧ φ2)[ϕ/¬errorϕ] ∀i ≥ 0. The opposite
direction can be proved in the same way.
Finally, consider the case φ = φ1 ∨ φ2. If σ |= φ, then
by inductive hypothesis either τ(i) |= φ1[ϕ/¬errorϕ] ∀i ≥
0 or τ(i) |= φ2[ϕ/¬errorϕ] ∀i ≥ 0; thus τ(i) |= (φ1 ∨
φ2)[ϕ/¬errorϕ] ∀i ≥ 0. For the opposite direction, assume
that τ(i) |= (φ1 ∨ φ2)[ϕ/¬errorϕ] ∀i ≥ 0; since each errorϕ
is monotone (once set to true, it remains true forever), it
holds that either τ(i) |= φ1[ϕ/¬errorϕ] ∀i ≥ 0 or τ(i) |=
φ2[ϕ/¬errorϕ] ∀i ≥ 0. By inductive hypothesis, either σ |= φ1
or σ |= φ2, that is σ |= φ1 ∨ φ2.
Complexity. Let n = |φ|; it holds that:
• |X| = |MP |+ |MF | ∈ O(n), since |MP |+ |MF | ≤ n;
• |I(X)|, |T (X,Σ, X ′)| ∈ O(n), since they are both sum-
mations over the variables in X;
• |S(X)| ∈ O(n), since S(X) is obtained from φ by
replacing each subformula in MF with a variable.
Overall, we have that the size of A(φ) is O(n).
Proof: Let φ be an LTLEBR formula of size n. By Prop. 3,
we can build an equivalent PastLTLEBR formula φ′ of size
O(n3 · M log2 n+1); by Prop. 4, from φ′ we can obtain an
equivalent canonical PastLTLEBR formula φ′′ of linear size with
respect to |φ|. Finally, by Prop. 9, the size of the deterministic
symbolic safety automaton A(φ′′) is linear in |φ′|, hence
| A(φ′′)| ∈ O(n3 ·M log2 n+1).
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Corollary 2: Let φ be an LTLEBR formula with no constants,
with |φ| = n. Then, there exists a deterministic SSA of size
O(n3) that accepts the same language.
Proof: Let φ be an LTLEBR formula with no constants;
then M = 1. By Theorem 1, the size of the deterministic
symbolic safety automaton recognizing the language of φ is
O(n3).
APPENDIX B
PLOTS
Figure 11. ebr-ltl-synth vs ltlsynt (second conf.) on all scalable benchmarks.
Figure 12. ebr-ltl-synth vs Strix (second conf.) on all scalable benchmarks.
APPENDIX C
PSEUDOCODES
Figure 13. ebr-ltl-synth vs ltlsynt (first conf.) on SYNTCOMP benchmarks.
Figure 14. ebr-ltl-synth vs ltlsynt (second conf.) on SYNTCOMP benchmarks.
Figure 15. ebr-ltl-synth vs Strix (first conf.) on SYNTCOMP benchmarks.
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Figure 16. ebr-ltl-synth vs Strix (second conf.) on SYNTCOMP benchmarks.
Figure 17. ebr-ltl-synth vs Ssyft on SYNTCOMP benchmarks.
/ / I n p u t : φ ∈ LTLEBR , i n f u t u r e = f a l s e
/ / Ou tpu t : φ ∈ PastLTLEBR
toPastLtlEbr (φ , i n f u t u r e ){
s w i t c h (φ){
c a s e p :
r e t u r n p ;
c a s e ¬φ1 :
c a s e ψ1 U [0,k] ψ2 :
r e t u r n pastify(φ)
c a s e φ1 ∧ φ2 :
r e t u r n toPastLtlEbr (φ1 , i n f u t u r e ) ∧
toPastLtlEbr (φ2 , i n f u t u r e )
c a s e φ1 ∨ φ2 :
i f ( i n f u t u r e )
r e t u r n pastify(φ)
e l s e
r e t u r n toPastLtlEbr (φ1 , i n f u t u r e ) ∨
toPastLtlEbr (φ2 , i n f u t u r e )
c a s e Xφ1 :
s w i t c h (φ1 ){
c a s e φ2 ∧ φ3 :
c a s e Xφ2 :
c a s e Gφ2 :
c a s e ψR φ2 :
r e t u r n X(toPastLtlEbr (φ1 , t r u e ))
d e f a u l t :
r e t u r n X(pastify(φ1))
}
c a s e Gφ1 :
s w i t c h (φ1 ){
c a s e φ2 ∧ φ3 :
c a s e Xφ2 :
c a s e Gφ2 :
c a s e ψR φ2 :
r e t u r n G(toPastLtlEbr (φ1 , t r u e ))
d e f a u l t :
r e t u r n G(pastify(φ1))
}
c a s e ψR φ1 :
s w i t c h (φ1 ){
c a s e φ2 ∧ φ3 :
c a s e Xφ2 :
c a s e Gφ2 :
c a s e ψ′ R φ2 :
r e t u r n ψR (toPastLtlEbr (φ1 , t r u e ))
d e f a u l t :
r e t u r n ψR (pastify(φ1))
}
}
}
Figure 18. toPastLtlEbr algorithm.
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/ / I n p u t : φ ∈ PastLTLEBR
/ / Ou tpu t : φ ∈ c a n o n i c a l LTLEBR
/ / N o t a t i o n :
/ / φ, φ1, . . . , φn ∈ LTLEBR
/ / ψ,ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 ∈ LTLFP
/ / p ∈ Σ
applyR1R7(φ){
s w i t c h (φ){
/ / Base c a s e = LTLFP f o r m u l a e
c a s e p :
c a s e ¬ψ :
c a s e Yψ1 :
c a s e ψ1 S ψ2 :
r e t u r n φ
/ / And / Or O p e r a t o r s
c a s e φ1 ∧ φ2 :
c a s e φ1 ∨ φ2 :
r e t u r n applyR1R7(φ1) ∧
applyR1R7(φ2)
/ / Next R e w r i t i n g Rules
c a s e Xφ1 :
φ1 ← applyR1R7(φ1)
s w i t c h (φ1 ){
c a s e φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ φn : / / r u l e R1
r e t u r n Xφ2 ∧ · · · ∧ Xφn
d e f a u l t :
r e t u r n Xφ1
}
/ / G l o b a l l y R e w r i t i n g Rules
c a s e Gφ1 :
φ1 ← applyR1R7(φ1)
s w i t c h (φ1 ){
c a s e φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ φn : / / r u l e R2
φ2 ← r e s o l v e g l o b a l l y (φ2 )
. . .
φn ← r e s o l v e g l o b a l l y (φn )
r e t u r n φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ φn
d e f a u l t :
φ1 ← r e s o l v e g l o b a l l y (φ1 )
r e t u r n φ1
}
/ / R e l e a s e R e w r i t i n g Rules
c a s e ψR φ1 :
φ1 ← applyR1R7(φ1)
s w i t c h (φ1 ){
c a s e φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ φn : / / r u l e R2
φ2 ← r e s o l v e r e l e a s e (ψ ,φ2 )
. . .
φn ← r e s o l v e r e l e a s e (ψ ,φn )
r e t u r n φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ φn
d e f a u l t :
φ1 ← r e s o l v e r e l e a s e (ψ ,φ1 )
r e t u r n φ1
}
d e f a u l t :
u n r e a c h a b l e c o d e ( )
}
}
Figure 19. The applyR1R7 algorithm (part I).
r e s o l v e g l o b a l l y (φ){
s w i t c h (φ){
c a s e Xiψ : / / r u l e R3 (2 nd c a s e )
r e t u r n XiGψ
c a s e XiGψ : / / r u l e R5
r e t u r n XiGψ
c a s e Xi(ψR ψ1) : / / r u l e R6
r e t u r n XiGψ1
d e f a u l t :
r e t u r n Gψ
}
}
r e s o l v e r e l e a s e (Xiψ1 ,φ){
s w i t c h (φ){
c a s e Xjψ2 : / / r u l e R3
i f ( i > j )
r e t u r n Xi(ψ1 R (Yi−jψ2))
e l s e
r e t u r n Xj((Yj−iψ1)R ψ2)
c a s e XjGψ2 : / / r u l e R7
i f ( i > j )
r e t u r n XiG(Yi−jψ2)
e l s e
r e t u r n XjGψ2
c a s e Xj(ψ2 R φ3) : / / r u l e R4
i f ( i > j )
r e t u r n Xi(ψ1 R ((Yi−jψ2)R (Yi−jψ3)))
e l s e
r e t u r n Xj((Yj−iψ1)R (ψ2 R ψ3))
d e f a u l t :
r e t u r n (Xiψ1)R φ
}
}
Figure 20. The applyR1R7 algorithm (part II).
flatten(φ){
s w i t c h (φ){
c a s e φ1 ∧ φ2 :
r e t u r n flatten(φ1) ∧ flatten(φ2)
c a s e φ1 ∨ φ2 :
r e t u r n flatten(φ1) ∨ flatten(φ2)
/ / r u l e Rflat
c a s e Xi(ψ1 R (ψ2 R (. . . (ψn−1 R ψn) . . . ))) :
r e t u r n Xi((ψn−1 ∧ O(ψn−2 ∧ . . .O(ψ1 ∧ Yi>) . . . ))R ψn)
d e f a u l t :
r e t u r n φ
}
}
Figure 21. The flatten algorithm.
